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JAMES V. OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY': OHIO DECLARES PROMOTION
AND TENURE RECORDS OF STATE-SUPPORTED UNIVERSITIES
AND COLLEGES PUBLIC RECORDS SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE
Indeed, if there is a "smoking gun" to be found that demonstrates discrimi-
nation in tenure decisions, it is likely to be tucked away in peer review
files.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout our nation's institutions of higher learning, professors teach,
perform research and publish literature in the hopes of becoming a tenured
faculty member. Typically, the decision to grant tenure3 to a faculty member
is decided through a peer review system. Many universities have suggested
that the First Amendment protects the confidentiality of this process through
the academic freedom doctrine. However, in University of Pennsylvania v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Supreme Court held that
universities do not enjoy a First Amendment or common law privilege against
disclosure of peer review materials.4
1.637 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio 1994).
2. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193 (1990) (Justice Blackmun utilized
this reasoning in his landmark decision on access to peer review files).
3. In a recent case, the Second Circuit articulated five factors that make tenure decisions
more difficult to review than other employment decisions:
(1) The lifelong commitment by university through tenure accentuates the importance of
colleagueship among professors.
(2) Tenure decisions are often non-competitive. An award of tenure to one individual
does not necessarily preclude the tenure of another, whereas in other areas of employment,
a decision to hire one person means a decision not to hire another.
(3) Tenure decisions are unusually decentralized, and there is greater deference given to
the department's position than in most employment decision-making processes.
(4) There are numerous factors that a school considers in tenure deliberations that are
peculiar to the university setting.
(5) Tenure decisions are often a source of unusually great disagreement, and because
opinions of a candidate are solicited from students, faculty members, and outside persons,
tenure files are frequently composed of irreconcilable evaluations.
Elizabeth Kluger, Sex Discrimination in the Tenure System at American Colleges and
Universities: The Judicial Response, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 319 (1986) (quoting Zahorik v. Cornell
Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1984)).
4. University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 182.
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Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex. rel. James v. Ohio State
University5 faced the issue of whether tenure records are subject to disclosure
under the Ohio Public Records Act.6 Clearly, open access to an individual's
tenure and promotion records has wide-ranging implications for the tenure
process. The possibility of publicly accessible evaluations may force evalua-
tors to be less candid in their comments, thereby depriving a university of the
valuable information necessary to make informed tenure decisions. However,
the court found unpersuasive Ohio State's I arguments that these documents
fall under the confidentiality exceptions of the Ohio Public Records Act or
that making them accessible would violate the academic freedom necessary
to ensure a proper functioning of the tenure process. 8
This Note will examine the national trend employed by different courts
in dealing with the issue of access to peer review materials. Section II of this
Note delineates the recent case law in university peer review cases. Next,
Section III presents the statement of the case and details the impact of an
action in mandamus. Finally, Section IV analyzes the Ohio Supreme Court's
ruling in light of the University's arguments of academic freedom and the
need for confidentiality.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Academic Freedom
The issue of access to tenure files maintained by a university most of
ten arises in discrimination suits brought by faculty who have been denied
tenure. 9 Courts have attempted to define this issue against the backdrop of
academic freedom, but the exact nature of this doctrine in relation to First
Amendment rights remains undefined. ° In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the
5. James, 637 N.E.2d at 911.
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1995). See infra note 69 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the Ohio Public Records Act.
7. Ohio State University hereinafter referred to as 'University'.
8. James, 637 N.E.2d at 913.
9. See Douglas Lederman, Will Unlocking the Files Disrupt the Process?, THE CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 14, 1995, at A18. While most peer review cases involve discrimination
suits brought by the EEOC, James dealt with an individual's desire to search for the reasoning
behind why his application for tenure was not granted. See generally James v. Ohio State
Univ., 637 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio 1994). Professor James believed that inappropriate references
and personal bias were shown toward his age during his tenure review. Id.
10. See Clisby Louise Hall Barrow, Note, Academic Freedom and the University Title VII
Suit after University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC and Brown v. Trustees of Boston University,
43 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1581-94 (1990) (this commentator provides background information
[Vol. 29:1
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United States Supreme Court first recognized the importance of academic
freedom as a means to protect the free flow of ideas on a college campus." In
support of its position, the Court delineated the essential freedoms it believed
necessary for a university to function efficiently. 2 However, in recent de-
cades, the Court has struggled to define the exact nature of academic freedom
as a First Amendment right. 3 In Regents of University of California v. Baake,
the Court described academic freedom as a special concern of the First
Amendment. 4 This ideal was reiterated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents in
which the Supreme Court stressed the importance of allowing a university to
become "a marketplace of ideas,"'5 as its success depends upon a wide-open
on the concept of academic freedom and the impact this principle will have as courts decide
the issue of public's access to tenure review files).
11. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(establishing the "academic freedom" doctrine). This case involved a professor who refused
to answer questions concerning the content of lectures he gave. Id. at 243-44. The court
proposed the doctrine of academic freedom in the context of free speech, not to advance the
independent institutional rights of the university. id. at 250.
12. Id. at 262-63 (stating that the four essential freedoms of a university are "the right to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."). The opinion continues to describe the importance
of academic freedom in stating:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-
evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual
leaders would imperil the future of our nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Id. at 250.
13. Professor Lawrence Tribe proposed that while the Supreme Court has not yet recognized
academic freedom as falling under first amendment protection, it has implicitly acknowledged
its importance. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 813 (2d ed. 1988).
14. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (stating
"[alcademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."). Justice Powell's opinion cited
Justice Frankfurter's 'four essential freedoms' as support for the autonomy of a university to
select its student body. Id. at 318. Despite this reference, the principle of academic freedom
has never been applied to justify a university's institutional rights. Id. at 312. Academic
freedom was developed in the context of the free speech rights of professors and students to
exchange ideas on campus. Id.
15. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom... [ . .. The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discover
truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.' (citations omitted).
Summer 1995]
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debate of beliefs. For academic freedom to be applicable in peer review cases,
the court must determine that it applies not only to content-based speech
cases, but also to the decision-making procedures of a university. 6 In aca-
demic decisions, courts have historically exercised a certain degree of defer-
ence to a university's autonomy in deciding their own policies.' Academic
freedom as a constitutional right offers a potential means to minimize judicial
interference in a university's affairs.'
B. Peer Review Privilege
One of the primary vehicles for protecting academic freedom in the peer
review context is the creation of an evidentiary privilege for peer review
materials. 9 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, privileges are to be deter-
mined on a "case-by-case basis."20 Rule 501 recognizes five grounds for the
creation of an evidentiary privilege: federal common law, the Constitution,
federal statutes, Supreme Court rules, and state law.2'
ld. See also Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952); United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that all
members of society, especially teachers, need constitutional thought).
16. See Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985).
"Academic freedom not only protects the free uninhibited exchange of ideas among faculty
and students; it also confers on the institution the right of autonomous decision-making in
certain narrow areas where decisions are required to be made based on the "expert evaluation
of cumulative information." Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)). This decision has been interpreted to mean courts should show respect to a university's
faculty when reviewing decisions based on academic grounds. Id. at 227.
17. See Don Mark North, Note, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC: The Denial of An
Academic Freedom Privilege, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 219 (1990) (providing a detailed discussion
on the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC and
the attempt to create an academic freedom privilege).
18. See Lynda E. Frost, Shifting Meanings of Academic Freedom: An Analysis of University
of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 17 J.C. & U.L. 329 (1991) (providing a detailed analysis of judicial
responses to the academic freedom doctrine).
19. Id.
20. FED. R. EvID. 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
an act of Congress or in rules proscribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principle of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience.
Id. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). See also In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d
426, 429 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating privileges are based upon the idea that certain societal
values are more important than the search for truth).
21. See David McMillin, Note, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC and Dixon v. Rutgers:
Two Supreme Courts Speak on the Academic Freedom Privilege, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089,
1091 (1990) (providing discussion of grounds for evidentiary privileges). See also 8
[Vol. 29:1
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Congress has attempted to offer some guidance on the issue of a peer
review privilege. Originally, universities were excluded from Title VII cov-
erage in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, Congress began to recognize
that discrimination was occurring in university hiring decisions as well as in
other parts of society. Congress considered the impact of these discrimina-
tory practices and the effect it would have on college-age students.22 In 1972,
Congress reacted to these discriminatory practices by bringing universities
within the reach of Title VII. 23 When amending Title VII, however, Congress
failed to enact special rules or privileges in the academic context. 24 Gradu-
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (McNaughton 1961 & Supp.
1991). A privilege is recognized when societal interests in disclosure of information is
determined to be more important than discovery of the truth. Wigmore suggested four factors
to determine if a privilege exists:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Id.
22. See HOUSE EDUC. AND LABOR COMM., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1972, H.R. Rep.
NO. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155.
[D]iscrimination in educational institutions is especially critical. The committee can
not imagine a more sensitive area than educational institutions where the Nation's
youth are exposed to a multitude of ideas that will strongly influence their future
development. To permit discrimination here would, more than in any other area, tend
to promote misconceptions leading to future patterns of discrimination.
Id.
23. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 190 (1990). Eight years after Title
VII was enacted with an exemption for educational institutions, Congress amended the Act
by specifically eliminating that exception. Id. This extension of Title VII was Congress'
considered response to the widespread and compelling problem of invidious discrimination
in educational institutions. Id. The House Report focused specifically on discrimination,
including the lack of access for women and minorities in higher ranking (i.e. tenured) academic
positions. Id. Opponents claimed that enforcement of Title VII would weaken institutions of
higher education by interfering with decisions to hire and promote faculty members. Id. One
cannot seriously contend that Congress was oblivious to concerns of academic autonomy
when it abandoned the exemption. Id.
24. McMillin, supra note 21, at 1102. When Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to
eliminate the exemption of education-related institutions, Congressional opponents of this
change argued that enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in the academic context would
unduly damage the hiring and promotion decision process in higher education. Id. at 1109.
However, Congress enacted no special rules for the application of Title VII in an educational
context. Id. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.92-261, Sec.
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ally, the academic freedom granted to a university to operate its own affairs
has eroded, ar.d the courts have evaluated a university on the same criteria as
any other employer. 25
In EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, the Seventh Circuit
developed a qualified privilege for peer review materials provided by confi-
dential evaluators. 26 Under this qualified privilege, an agency must demon-
strate a 'particularized need' for relevant information in order to gain access
to redacted materials.27 Such a qualified academic privilege should balance
the need for confidentiality in appraising a candidate and the benefits of dis-
closure to employees seeking evidence of discrimination.2" The Seventh Cir-
cuit believed that the interests fostered by creating a qualified privilege out-
weighed the interests served by greater disclosure and would, in this case,
safeguard the relationships it was designed to protect.29
In comparison, the Third Circuit rejected the principle of a qualified
privilege.3" The court spurned the confidentiality and first amendment
concerns of the university and held that nothing beyond a showing of "mere
relevance" is needed to gain access to confidential peer review files. 3 This
holding was extended in In re Dinnan, where even the vote of a faculty mem-
ber was held to be discoverable.32 Thus, under this view, the academic free-
dom interests of a university are not implicated when discriminatory
3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-I (1988)).
25. Susan L. Pacholski, Comment, Title VII in the University: The Difference Academic
Freedom Makes, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1325 (1992) (providing an assessment of the
impact removal of the Title VII exemption from educational institutions has had on
discriminatory suits brought when a professor is denied tenure).
26. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that "disclosure of some of the contents of peer
review files would assist judicial progress toward ending discrimination, promote the proper
functioning of EEOC investigatory powers, and academic excellence, which is fostered when
disclosure roots out discriminatory decisions.").
27. Id. at 338.
28. Id. at 337.
29. Id. at 336 ("The process of peer evaluation has evolved as the best and most reliable
method of promoting academic excellence and freedom.").
30. EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1163 (1986). The court held that:
"In the face of the clear mandate from Congress which identified and recognized the
threat of unchecked discrimination in education, we have no choice but to trust that the
honesty and integrity of the tenured reviewers in evaluation decisions will overcome
feelings of discomfort and embarrassment and will outlast the demise of absolute
confidentiality".
Id. at 115.
3 1. Id.
32. In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th cir. 1981).
[Vol. 29:1
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practices in hiring may have occurred. 33 Courts will not provide a higher
degree of protection to academic peer review materials than to any other non-
privileged, but confidential communications. 34
Another approach, used in Gray v. Board of Higher Education,3 5 has
been to apply a balancing test to determine the right of access to peer review
materials. The "Gray" balancing test employed a "fair opportunity" standard,
that is less stringent than the "particularized need" element of the qualified
privilege doctrine.3 6 This test balances the professor's need for the informa-
tion in his or her tenure files against the school's concern for the confidenti-
ality of its evaluations.3 7 When the Supreme Court faced the issue of access
to peer review files, it did not apply or explicitly overrule the Gray balancing
test.3 8 Therefore, the Gray test may still be argued by universities as a means
to analyze this issue.
These various responses to claims for a qualified academic privilege led
the Supreme Court to hear the case of University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.39
A professor at the University claimed that she was refused tenure based upon
33. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 115. The court balanced the public's interest in "the
vital truth-seeking function of our justice system" against the need to protect the academic
freedom of the University. Id. The court held that academic freedom interests were not
implicated where a decision about terms and conditions of employment was challenged as
having been made on other than academic grounds. Id.
The court continued to state:
we fail to see how, if a tenure committee is acting in good faith, our decision today
will adversely affect its decision-making process. Indeed, this opinion should work to
reinforce responsible decision-making in tenure questions as it sends out a clear signal
to would-be wrongdoers that they may not hide behind "academic freedom" to avoid
responsibility for their actions.
Id. at 117.
34. Keynes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
904 (1977). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (refusing to extend a privilege
of confidentiality to a news reporter to conceal his source of information, despite the
implication that this would inhibit the freedom of the press under the First Amendment).
35. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
36. See Mary Delano, Discovery in University Employment Discrimination Suits: Should
Peer Review Materials Be Privileged?, 14 J.C. & U.L. 121, 135 (1987) (providing an analysis
of the cases which argue the necessity of an academic peer review privilege).
37. Gray, 692 F.2d at 901.
38. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
39. Id. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, a female professor of Asian descent was
denied tenure, despite her belief that she held better qualifications than five male professors
who received more favorable treatment. Id. at 185. To substantiate her claim, she sought
access to the chairman's letter of evaluation, along with the materials in other professors'
tenure files. Id. at 186. Without these materials, she believed she would not have the
information upon which to base a comparison between herself and other candidates and proving
her pretext would be hopeless. Id.
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her gender.4" In order to substantiate her charges of discrimination, the pro-
fessor sought access to the University's tenure files.4' The Supreme Court
declined to find either a common law or First Amendment privilege to main-
tain the confidentiality of peer review materials in university tenure deci-
sions.42
When considering the possible harm to the tenure process, the Supreme
Court held that allowing the documents to be accessible would not cause
evaluators to be less candid in their comments.43 The Court stated that the
University's First Amendment right to academic freedom was "remote and
attenuated. '44 Justice Blackmun further stated that the Court is inclined to-
ward restraint in using its authority to create or expand privileges where
Congress has previously considered the issue.45 The University's need for
academic freedom in maintaining the confidentiality of its peer review files
must give way to the victim's right to the evidence which may substantiate a
charge of discrimination. 46 The Court found a difference between the right to
academic freedom in content-based speech cases versus the need for academic
freedom in maintaining the confidentiality of university files.47 The Court
concluded that the University was seeking an expanded doctrine of academic
freedom, which would increase the University's power to control its own
affairs. 48 The University's arguments failed in this case because the govern-
mental action was neither an attempt to control the content of academic speech
nor a direct infringement on the right of the University to select its own faculty.49
Hence, the Supreme Court reinforced Congress' belief that higher education
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 182.
43. Id. at 200-01. The Supreme Court stated:
[flinally, we are not so ready to assume the worst about those in the academic
community. Although it is possible that some evaluators may become less candid as
the possibility of disclosure increases, others may simply ground their evaluations in
specific examples and illustrations in order to deflect potential claims of bias or
unfairness. Not all academics will hesitate to stand up and be counted when they
evaluate their peers....
id.
44. University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 200.
45. Id.
46. Id,
47. Id. at 198-99. The typical university academic freedom case dealt with content of
speech engaged in by the university or those affiliated with it or involved direct infringements
on the asserted right to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach. Id.
48. Id. The University was seeking an expanded right of academic freedom where discovery
would not be permissible because it conflicts with the University's right to academic freedom.
Id.
49. Id. at 198-201.
[Vol. 29:1
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cannot expect special treatment in matters of employment discrimination. 0
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
William Calvin James, an assistant professor at The Ohio State Univer-
sity, applied for tenure in the Department of Geology. After receiving a
13-3 positive vote by the faculty of his department, James' tenure application
was turned down at the College level. 5' On February 9, 1994, James re-
quested a copy of the Chairperson's letter of evaluation in his tenure file under
the Ohio Public Records Act, O.R.C. 149.43.52 The University responded by
stating "that documents that reveal the name and identity of an information
source who has been promised confidentiality are not considered public un-
der the Act ."51 Professor James then expanded his request to include all in-
formation in his tenure file, his fourth year review file, the tenure files for the
last six years from the Department of Geological Sciences and the promotion
and tenure files for the College of Mathematical and Physical Sciences for the
last three years. 54
The University responded by offering James a redacted version of his
own file, but refused access to other files as an "unreasonable and inappropri-
ate request for use of public records. ' 55 The University would permit James
to see confidential materials, but only if he wrote to and received permission
from the corresponding sources.56 James reacted by writing a memorandum
spelling out the reasons he believed the school's claims of confidentiality
were unfounded. " The University continued to stand by its position that
James could only view a redacted version of his file or attempt to seek permis-
50. Eileen N. Wagner, Tenure Committees, Take Heed: University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
Should Change the Way You Proceed, 64 EDUC. L. REP. 979 (1991).
51. See Brief for Relator at 3, James v. Ohio State Univ., 637 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio 1994) (No.
94-833) [hereinafter referred to as Brief for Relator]. See also Lederman, supra note 9. In
discussing his case, Professor James stated "I felt I had a right to know why a very positive
decision at the department level was reversed at the dean's level. I felt the process had been
secret too long, and I thought something should be done about it." Id.
52. Brief for Relator, supra note 51, at 3.
53. Brief for Respondent at 4, James v. Ohio State Univ., 637 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio 1994).
(No. 94-833) [hereinafter referred to as Brieffor Respondent].
54. See Brief for Relator, supra note 51, at 4.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5.
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sion from the letter writers. 8 Also, the Chairperson's letter would be unavail-
able due to its confidential nature.5 9 On March 15, 1994, James examined his
file and found numerous redactions from the text as well as many missing
documents.
60
These developments caused Professor James to seek access to all promo-
tion and tenure files at the University for the last three years, along with all
documents related to the restructuring program at the school. 61 The Associ-
ate Provost forwarded the restructuring materials, but referred the request for
access to the tenure files to the school's legal department. 62 The legal office
responded by stating that James only had a right to view a redacted version of
his own file and not any other file on record at the University.
63
B. Mandamus Action
Under the Ohio Public Records Act, the proper recourse in seeking
access to a public record is a writ of mandamus compelling a state agency to
provide access to the records requested. 64 If the state agency wishes to deny
58. See Brief for Relator, supra note 51, at 5-6.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id.
61. See Brief for Relator, supra note 51, at 6-7.
62. Id. at 7. Associate Provost Nancy Rudd referred James' request for all tenure files at
the University to the legal office.
63. Id. at 8-9. The University's counsel believed that it did not have to comply with James
requests for the following reasons:
(1) [T]he release of promotion and tenure files to persons other than the relevant
candidates themselves could violate those candidates' and their evaluators'
constitutional right of privacy.
(2) Ohio's Public Records Statute provides an express exception for documents and
information that would reveal "[tihe identity of an information source to whom
confidentiality has been reasonably promised."
(3) The Pubic Records Statute does not contemplate that any individual has the right
to a complete duplication of the voluminous files kept by governmental agencies.
(4) The University therefore holds that the requests are improper and the University
does not have to comply with them.
Id.
64. Ohio Public Records Act specifies that:
If a person allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of a governmental unit to promptly
prepare a public record and to make it available to him for inspection in accordance
with division (B) of this section, or if a person who has requested a copy of a public
record allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of a person responsible for it to make a
copy available to him in accordance with division (B) of this section, the person
allegedly aggrieved may commence a mandamus action to obtain a judgement that
[Vol. 29:1
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access to the requested records, it must offer evidence as to why access to the
record in question should not be granted.6 5 Under the Act, an original action
to compel a state agency to disclose its records may be commenced in the Ohio
Supreme Court, under Section 2 of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.66
Mandamus actions are employed when a court decides that the plaintiff has
a clear legal right to relief.67 This typically occurs when there is no adequate
remedy at law available and the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform the
requested act.
61
C. The Ohio Supreme Court's Opinion
In a 7-0 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the promotion and
tenure records of state-supported institutions of higher learning are "public
records" subject to public record disclosure requirements. 69 The court held
that the University's arguments for a confidentiality exception did not fall
within the language of the statute.7" The University argued that an evaluator
is the equivalent of "an information source or witness to whom confidential-
orders the governmental unit or the person responsible for the public records to comply
with division (B) of this section and award reasonable attorney's fees to the person
that instituted the mandamus action.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1995).
65. Id.
66. OHIO CONST, art. IV, § 2, (B)(1) (1994). The supreme court shall have original action
jurisdiction in the following type of actions: (a) quo warranto, (b) mandamus, (c) habeas
corpus, (d) prohibition, (e) procedendo, (f) in any cause on review as may be necessary to its
complete determination. Id.
67. State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing v. Lesak, 457 N.E.2d 821, 822-23 (Ohio 1984).
68. Id. at 823.
69. James v. Ohio State University, 637 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio 1994). Justice Craig Wright
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices A. William Sweeney, Pfeifer, Francis E.
Sweeney, Resnick and Douglas. Id. at 913. Justice Moyer concurred in syllabus and judgement
only. Id. at 911.
70. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1995) stating:
Confidential law enforcement investigatory records means any record that pertains to
law enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature,
but only to the extent that the release of the record would create a high probability of
disclosure of any of the following:
(a) the identity of a suspect who has not been charged with the offense to which the
records pertain or of an information source or witness to whom confidentiality has
been reasonably promised;
(b) Information provided by an information source or witness to whom confidentiality
has been reasonably promised, which information would reasonably tend to disclose
his identity.
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ity has been reasonably promised" under O.R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) and (b). 7
However, the court pointed out that the University's interpretation ignored the
"confidential law enforcement investigatory records" limitation to the excep-
tion under O.R.C. 149.43(A)(2). 72 Although the University argued that their
external evaluators believed that their letters were written in confidentiality,
a memo by the provost on this subject contradicted their position.7 3 This
memo provided notice to evaluators that the confidentiality of their letters
could not be assured in light of the Ohio Public Records Act.74
Furthermore, the court concluded that the University's academic free-
dom argument failed for the same reason the United State Supreme Court
rejected this argument, when that Court considered whether tenure files were
discoverable by the EEOC in a Title VII investigation.7 5 The issue before the
court was not whether the "university was permitted to decide on academic
grounds who receives tenure, but whether the records of those decisions are
public records."7 6 It appeared contradictory for the University to argue the
need for academic freedom, while it promoted a procedure of maintaining the
unavailability of secret files even to the person who is the subject of the evalu-
ation. 77
Even if the court was convinced that the disclosure of tenure records
would be detrimental to the tenure process, it held that the General Assembly
in O.R.C. 149.43 had already specified the records that were exempt. 7 To
interpret the Public Records Act differently would be a public policy consid-
eration which is not the court's purpose. 79 Previously, in State ex. rel. Mul-
timedia v. Whalen, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the General
71. James, 637 N.E.2d at 911.
72. Id.
73. Id. Senior Vice President and Provost for Academic Affairs Sisson sent a memo to the
persons involved in the tenure procedure entitled REMINDERS AND SUGGESTIONS. In
this memo, Provost Sission stated:
Confidentiality:
While it is the policy of the Ohio State University to maintain confidentiality regarding
access to letters of evaluation from both within and outside the university, the Ohio
Public Records Act does not exempt such materials from the law at present. Nonetheless,
every effort should be made to limit access to these letters only to persons directly
involved in the promotion and tenure review process. External evaluators should be
informed of Ohio State's policy and its standing under the Ohio Public Records Act.
Id. at 912.
74. Id.
75. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
76. James, 637 N.E.2d at 913.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Assembly, in enumerating very narrow and specific exceptions to the public
record statute, had already considered the competing public policy consider-
ations.8 0 The General Assembly favored the public's right to know how its
state agencies make decisions over the potential harm imposed on a state
agency by disclosure.8'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Ohio Public Records Statute
Under O.R.C. 149.43, all public agencies must make their records avail-
able for disclosure in order to allow the public to monitor their activities. 82 In
previous cases on this subject, universities have been defined as "public of-
fices."83 Also, under O.R.C. 149.01 l(b), a state-supported institution of
higher education is considered a state agency.84 In addition, a public record
is "any record that is kept by a public office. ' 85 These records include "any
documents under the jurisdiction of a public office which serve to document
the functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities
of the office." 8 6
The University agreed that it is a "state agency" under O.R.C. 149.01 1.87
However, it contended that its tenure files were not subject to disclosure pur-
80. State ex rel. Multimedia v. Whalen, 549 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio 1990). In this case, a
television station demanded a tape recording of a police shooting under O.R.C. 149.43(B).
The Court held that the General Assembly had already weighed the competing interests in
open records cases and created exemptions where it believed were necessary. Id. See also
infra notes 76-87 (discussing the General Assembly's position on exceptions to the Ohio
Public Records Act).
81. James, 637 N.E.2d at 913-14.
82. Id. at 913 (citing public considerations which are beyond the judiciary's authority).
83. See e.g., State ex rel. Toledo Blade v. University of Toledo Foundation, 602 N.E.2d
1159 (Ohio 1992); State ex rel. Halaby v. Board of Directors of University of Cincinnati, 123
N.E.2d 3 (Ohio 1954).
84. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.011 (b) (Baldwin 1994). See infra note 88 and
accompanying text for further discussion.
85. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A) (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1995).
86. See Brief for Relator, supra note 51, at 9.
87. James v. Ohio State University, 637 N.E. 2d 911 (Ohio 1994). See also O.R.C.
149.011 (b) which states that:
"State Agency" includes every department, bureau, board, commission, office or other
organized body established by the constitution and laws of this state for the exercise of
any function of state government, including any state-supported institution of higher
education, the general assembly, or any legislative agency, any court or judicial agency,
or any political subdivision or agency thereof.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.011 (b) (Baldwin 1994).
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suant to the exceptions in O.R.C. 149.43(a)(2)(a), (b).a8 The statute exempts
"records the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law."8 9 In fact,
under federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to find either a com-
mon law or First Amendment right to keep peer review materials confidential
in tenure decisions.9 Previous Ohio case law has promulgated the rule that
exceptions to disclosure are to be "strictly construed" against the custodian
of public records and doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure. 91 The
burden to establish an exception to disclosure rests on the custodian of the
public records. 92 Thus far, the only situation in which the Ohio General As-
sembly has extended confidentiality in an educational setting is to student
information contained in public school files.9 3
Under O.R.C. 149.43, any person seeking discovery of public records
should be permitted access without stating a reason for their request. 94 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC held that
requiring the EEOC to demonstrate a specific reason for disclosure would
hinder the commission's attempt to prove discrimination.95 Other state courts
have followed this approach when determining whether to allow an examina-
tion of peer review files. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's position when it stated that "a plaintiff need not
demonstrate a particularized need for the materials in order to gain access to
them. '96 The balancing of conflicting interests in the tenure review process
88. Toledo Blade Co. v. University of Toledo, 602 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (Ohio 1992). The
court in this case held that:
It is the role of the General Assembly to balance the competing concerns of the public's
right to know and individual citizens' right to keep private certain information that
becomes part of the records of public offices. The General Assembly has done so, as
shown by numerous statutory exceptions to R.C. 149.43(b) found in both the statute
itself and in other parts of the Revised Code.
Id.
89. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (a)(1) (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1995).
90. See Brief for Relator, supra note 51, at 12.
91. State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co, v. Lasak, 457 N.E.2d 821, 823 (Ohio 1984).
92. State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 526 N.E.2d 786, 791 (Ohio 1988)
(Celebreeze, C.J., concurring).
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.321(a) ("No person shall release, or permit access to,
the names or other personally identifiable information concerning any students attending a
public school to any person or group for use in a profit-making plan or activity.").
94. State ex rel. Fant v. Enright, 610 N.E.2d 997, 998 (Ohio 1993). See also Gary Elson
Brown, The Right to Inspect Public Records In Ohio, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 518 (1976) (providing
a detailed description of the legislative history of Ohio's Public Records Statutes).
95. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193 (1990).
96. Dixon v. Rutgers, 541 A.2d 1046, 1057 (N.J. 1988) (holding that New Jersey does not
require an individual to demonstrate a particularized need for materials in order to gain access
to them).
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lies as a legislative function. The standard of relevance to gain these files
should be "virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations
against the employer."9 The benefit of viewing a significant number of per-
sonnel files without limitation provides a plaintiff with the necessary context
to determine if discrimination has occurred. 9 Therefore, any attempt to limit
access to peer review materials will be struck down, because it hinders the
plaintiff's opportunity to compare his or her case to other candidates. 99
B. "Chilling Effect" on Tenure Process
One of the primary arguments offered by universities as to why these
records should remain confidential is that candid evaluation of the candidate
is needed in order for the tenure process to be effective.'0 0 Although such
discovery may expose an evaluators' comments, a writer can substantiate his
or her evaluation by articulating on academic grounds their judgment of a
candidate.' 0 ' However, by exposing an evaluator's written words, the tenure
process could be driven underground to verbal communications between the
97. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984) (holding that "it is the court's
responsibility to satisfy itself that the charge is valid and that the material requested is relevant
to the charge."). "More generally, the court should assess the contentions made by the employer
to ensure that the demand for information is not too indefinite or has been made for an
illegitimate purpose." Id.
98. Wagner, supra note 50. The meaning of academic freedom has changed based upon
the different contexts in which courts have applied this doctrine. Id. To ensure that the
tenure process is effective, opinions of a candidate should be based in fact and not just on a
personal opinion of a candidate. Id. at 981.
99. Dixon, 541 A.2d 1052. ("Courts recognize that even in academic settings a plaintiff
may show preferential or disparate treatment by comparing his or her credentials with those
of other faculty member.").
100. See Lederman, supra note 9, at A18. In the article, an assistant professor at Ohio
State discussed an evaluation letter where he described another professor as "on par with
some, but not quite as good as others." Id. In wake of the James decision, the professor
reassessed this letter by stating "At the very least, I'd probably write a very different kind of
letter. A critical letter could do a lot of damage to collegiality in a relatively small field like
linguistics. I work with these people." Id. Another administrator comments that "the process
depends on lots of people giving their best informed judgement, and writing the truth. If they
have to worry not only about whether this information is true, but how it's going to look in
The Chronicle, it's going to make this process less reliable." !d. at A19.
101. EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Dinnan,
661 F.2d 426, 434 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that: "in the face of the clear mandate from Congress
which identified and recognized the threat of unchecked discrimination in education, we have
no choice but to trust that the honesty and integrity of the tenured reviewers in evaluation
decisions will overcome feelings of discomfort and embarrassment and will outlast the demise
of absolute confidentiality."). These feelings of embarrassment in evaluating a colleagues
work can be overcome by articulating on academic grounds one's judgement of a candidate.
In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 434.
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members of the tenure committee. 0 2 In other words, a candidate's file may
contain positive written comments, but the "grapevine" could work to deny
a candidate tenure with no evidence of the basis for this decision.
Some doubt exists as to the importance of the confidential tenure review
process because "confidentiality is not the norm in all peer review sys-
tems."' 03 Justice Blackmun stated in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC that
structuring the tenure process to restrict open debate and inquiry seems con-
tradictory to the academic freedom doctrine.""' A confidential process re-
stricts open debate, because it confines relevant information to a limited group
of people. A more open procedure with participants offering evidence to
support their opinions would be more harmonious with the academic purpose
of a university. 05
In addition, many universities contend that the right to privacy protects
confidential evaluations from disclosure. However, professors at state uni-
versities, like other state employees, generally do not possess expectations of
confidentiality in most personnel matters. 0 6 Therefore, state faculty members
cannot be considered to have a "right of privacy" when the records are being
reviewed by a multitude of faculty.'0 7
Furthermore, Ohio does not have a state law right of privacy which
would prohibit the release of records to the public. 0 Recently, Ohio has
reaffirmed the right to unredacted copies of requested records in Thomas v.
Ohio State University."°9 In this case, the court has expanded the right of
102. Dennis Kelly, Tenure Ruling Has Universities Wary, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 1990, at
4D. The article offered the predictions of Ernst Benjamin, the general secretary of the American
Association of University Professors. Id. Mr. Benjamin states that "less in the files ... more
phone calls, more use of grapevine; really illicit means." Id. This result may occur because
evaluators will become increasingly fearful that their written words may lead to lawsuits
when a candidate fails to receive tenure. This will lead to less recorded documentation by
tenure review committees. Id.
103. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199-201 (1990) ( Justice Blackmun
did not believe peer reviewers would shy away from offering candid evaluations in tenure
decisions, he stated "not all academics will hesitate to stand up and be counted when they
evaluate their peers.").
104. Id. at 199.
105. Frost, supra note 18, at 329 (discussing the effects of opening the tenure review
process).
106. State ex rel. National Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 526 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio 1988).
107. See Brief for Relator, supra note 51, at 11.
108. See e.g. State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. University of Toledo, 602 N.E.2d 1159
(Ohio 1992); State v. Bundy, 485 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 1985); State ex rel. Dispatch Printing
Co. v. Wells, 481 N.E.2d 632 (Ohio 1985).
109. State ex rel. Thomas v. Ohio State University, 643 N.E. 2d 126 (Ohio 1994) (holding
that the O.R.C. 149.43 required the University to release the names and work addresses of
research scientists employed at the University).
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access to school's records, despite the threat of criminal conduct by the indi-
viduals seeking access to the files."'
C. Redaction
One issue which remains unaddressed by the federal courts is the right
of a university to redact names and information before releasing confidential
peer review materials."' The Supreme Court, in University of Pennsylvania,
did not rule out the possibility of redacting certain information from one's
file." '2 In EEOC v. University of Notre Dame, the Seventh Circuit allowed that
university "to redact the name, address, institutional affiliation and any other
identifying feature.""' 3 The only means to obtain this redacted information
would be a showing of "particularized need," which requires factual proof of
a compelling necessity for specific information."4 In its evaluation of a peer
review privilege, the Supreme Court declined to determine whether it is per-
missible to redact information from peer-review documents prior to making
them public." 5
In Dixon v. Rutgers, a threshold test was proposed to balance the inter-
ests involved in disclosure of peer review documents. 16 Other courts have
110. Thomas, 643 N.E.2d at 128 (Respondent in this case advocated the adoption of a
balancing test similar to the test employed by the Freedom of Information Act which is the
federal counterpart to O.R.C. 149.43). 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(G) allows federal agencies to withhold
information contained in "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Thomas, 643
N.E.2d at 129. Pursuant to this FAIA exemption, the court must balance the privacy interest
of the individual against the public interest in disclosure. See also Department of Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). However, the FAIA does not apply in this situation, and
O.R.C. 149.43 does not contain any similar personal-privacy provisions. Thomas, 643 N.E.2d
at 129.
111. McMillin, supra note 21, at 1089. Redaction procedures may result in causing the
harm they are designed to avert, "discouraging candid evaluations by a tenure candidate's
peers." Id. at 1101. Evaluators may be discouraged to avoid discussion of specific situations
that may lead to identify them in event that evaluation is discoverable. Id. at 1118.
112. Id. at 1116.
113. 715 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 1983).
114. Id.
115. See Frost, supra note 18, at 345 n.185 for a discussion of the benefits of redacting
material from peer review materials.
116. Dixon v. Rutgers, 541 A.2d 1046, 1061 (N.J. 1988) (O'Hern, J. concurring). Justice
O'Hern proposed a set of threshold factors he would recommend to trial courts in determining
whether to grant discovery:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will impede the university's functions by
discouraging academics from providing information to the university;
(2) the effect disclosure may have on persons who have already given such
information, and whether they did so in reliance that their identities would not be
disclosed;
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employed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to authorize redaction of certain
material. 17 Under this rule, courts may redact identifying language from peer
review files, thus allowing evaluators to remain anonymous.' However,
redacting some information may not provide a complete profile to determine
what the tenure decision was based upon." 9 Justice Blackmun addressed this
point when he stated "indeed, if there is a 'smoking gun' to be found that
demonstrates discrimination in tenure decisions, it is likely to be tucked away
in peer review files." 120 If an alleged perpetrator of discrimination could
decide what statements to redact, then access to peer review files would be
fruitless.'2 ' For example, a former tenured professor at the Ohio State Uni-
versity commented that "evaluators fear they could be sued if someone sees
their file and feels the evaluator's letter was responsible for the professor not
getting tenure, thus damaging his or her career." 122 Whether evaluators will
still provide candid comments amidst this type of environment does not seem
likely in light of the consequences of a negative comment.
In this case, James believed that access to all other files in the Univer-
(3) the extent to which university evaluations and promotion and tenure decisions
will be chilled by disclosure;
(4) the degree to which the information sought includes factual data as opposed to
subjective evaluations;
(5) whether any subsequent circumstances have circumscribed the candidate's need
for the materials.
Id. at 1062.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(C). See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201
n.9 (1990) (The Supreme Court not addressing whether university may redact information
from peer review files). In an earlier case, the court employed a Rule 26(c) protective order to
deny access to peer review material. See Keynes v. Lenior Rhyne College, 434 U.S. 904
(1977).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..
119. EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 117 (3d Cir. 1985).
Clearly an alleged penetrator of discrimination cannot be allowed to pick and choose
the evidence which may be necessary to an agency investigation. There may be
evidence of discriminatory intent and of pretext in the confidential notes and
memoranda which the college seeks to protect. Likewise, confidential matters
pertaining to other candidates for tenure in a similar time frame may demonstrate
the persons with lesser qualifications were granted tenure or that some pattern of
discrimination appears. The peer review material itself must be investigated to
determine whether the evaluations are based in discrimination and whether they are
reflected in the tenure decision.
Id. at 116.
120. University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 193.
121. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 117.
122. Alan D. Miller, Colleges Wince at Ruling, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 2, 1994, at 1E.
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sity would allow him to gain information on how other applicants handled the
appeals process and to provide a context in which to see what qualifications
successful tenure applicants possessed.'23 The University refused this request
along with James' request to view the Chairperson's evaluation letter.'24 In
comparison, courts have allowed even the vote of a tenure committee mem-
ber to be discoverable.'25 For example, in In re Dinnan, the Fifth Circuit held
that no privilege exists which can protect from discovery the vote of a mem-
ber of a faculty promotions committee. 26 Due to the importance of the infor-
mation which may be redacted, it appears unlikely that courts will allow any
deletion of materials from tenure files.'2 7 However, since the Supreme Court
left this issue unsettled by its decision in University of Pennsylvania, state
laws may vary on the constitutionality of redacting information from peer
review files. 2 '
CONCLUSION
The Ohio Supreme Court in James expands the public's right of access
123. Lederman, supra note 9, at Al. "Before this law, I would not have known how I was
evaluated and how others were evaluated, and I wouldn't have seen the inconsistencies. It
gave me the information I needed to know how I had grounds to challenge." Id. See also
Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 112. The Supreme Court in University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC endorsed the decision of Franklin & Marshall where comprehensive subopena included
significant number of personnel files. See generally University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,
493 U.S. 182 (1990).
124. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text for further discussion.
125. Schneider v. Northwestern University, 151 F.R.D. 319, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (ruling
that the University must identify the professor's peer reviewers and provide her with the
unredacted version of her file). The standard employed by the court weighed the confidentiality
and relevancy interests involved for each evaluator. Id.
126. In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
The court held that:
If a tenure committee is acting in good faith, our decision today will adversely
affect its decision-making process. Indeed, this opinion should work to reinforce
responsible decision-making in tenure decisions as it sends out a clear signal to
would-be wrongdoers that they may not hide behind "academic freedom" to avoid
responsibility for their actions.
Id.
127. Wagner, supra note 50, at 979. This commentator states:
That redaction seems unlikely, especially where subtle comparisons are to be made
in an attempt to fit individuals into the various patterns inferring discriminatory
intent. Comparisons, from which statistical patterns are found, must piece together
evidence of past remarks, past critiques, general attitudes or other pertinent facts
about the scholars involved. Without the scholars' identities, such comparisons
would be impossible.
Id.
128. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 n.9 (1990).
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to tenure files to unprecedented levels. Now, schools which obtain peer re-
view materials while evaluating a professor for tenure must kept these files as
"public records." Instead of hindering a university's right to academic free-
dom, the ruling in this case ensures the accountability of administrators in
their decision making. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the University's
claims that their constitutionally protected right to academic freedom was
being violated for the same reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC. 2 9 The disclosure of documents in one's
tenure file does not infringe upon the academic freedom of a university to
make tenure decisions based upon academic grounds.
For peer review files to be included in the confidentiality exceptions of
the Ohio Public Records Statute, the General Assembly must enact these
exemptions. The court and the university cannot offer a cloak of secrecy to
the tenure process, when our laws have promoted the public's right to know
and hold accountable our public officials. 3 ° This ruling has made tenure
records open not only to the candidate, but to any member of the public who
desires to view them. This openness should guard against abuses in a subjec-
tive system which decides the fate of an individual's career."'
ROBERT A. GERBERRY
129. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
130. Editorial & Comment, Welcome Ruling; University Promotion, Tenure Records Open,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 11, 1994, at 2F.
The Dispatch believes the system can and should work in an atmosphere of openness,
though that will make some people uncomfortable. Public money and the caliber of
public education are on the line when tenure decisions are made. In the long run,
the accountability of public-university officials to the tax-paying citizens of Ohio
should be enhanced.
id.
131. Presently, Ohio State and Interuniversity Council, which represents Ohio public
colleges, are lobbying state lawmakers to exempt tenure files, patent applications, and four
other kinds of university records from the Public Records Statue.
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